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HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS
PANEL
DAVID GOTTLIEB*
RANDALL COYNE'"
PROFESSOR GOTTLIEB: My name is David Gottlieb and I teach at the
University of Kansas School of Law. To my right is Professor Randall Coyne, who
teaches at the University of Oklahoma College of Law. My purpose today is to
speak briefly about habeas corpus for state prisoners in non-death penalty cases.
Professor Coyne will follow with some comments about death penalty cases. When
he has concluded, I would like to describe a case that was decided on Monday,'
which may have a significant impact on federal criminal litigation and therefore for
post-conviction challenges for individuals convicted of federal crimes.
My first thought when I was asked to talk about habeas corpus for state
prisoners was, "I didn't know you cared." In fact, in recent years the availability of
the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has been
narrowed dramatically. Through complex pleading requirements involving
exhaustion of remedies, through rules imposing procedural default, rules prohibiting
successive petitions, rules applying latches, and through rules on retroactivity, the
federal courts seem largely to have been taken out of the business of federal habeas
corpus for cases not involving the death penalty. 2
The shrinking role for habeas corpus is evinced in the relative decline in cases
filed by state prisoners. While prison populations have tripled or quadrupled in the
last twenty years, there has been no comparable increase in Section 2254 petitions.
The number of cases decided in favor of prisoners has declined even more
dramatically.
While the writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254 has retained a significant
amount of vitality in death penalty cases, its importance in non-death penalty cases
in the last twenty-five years has diminished. A generation ago, many commentators
likened federal habeas corpus to a kind of federal appeal as of right. State prisoners
with federal constitutional claims who wanted to have a federal forum hear their
claim were thought to be presumptively entitled to a hearing in a federal court. And
because the Supreme Court of the United States was obviously not in a position to
deal with the petitions of all state prisoners who had federal constitutional issues, the
theory was that the lower federal judiciary had been deputized to hear the cases.
Over the past twenty years, this expansive. view of habeas corpus has been
decisively rejected by the Supreme Court. Today, most state prisoners with
constitutional claims are unable to get a hearing in a federal court. What the court
has failed to do, however, is replace the former justification for habeas corpus with
any satisfactory account of the role of habeas corpus for this generation. In
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1. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Seeid. at310.
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Wainwright v. Sykes, 3 over twenty years ago, when the Supreme Court began its
process of cutting back the writ of habeas corpus, the majority promised that habeas
corpus would still have a place as a remedy for an individual whose custody is
unconstitutional, at least when that error reflected upon the basic justice of the
individual's incarceration. 4 But the cases in the last twenty years have not been
faithful to that theoretical position. The pleading requirements that are now in place
with respect to habeas corpus are pleading requirements that would be difficult to
impossible for seasoned attorneys to observe. For prisoners who are in custodial
institutions, the requirements are often impossible. While some prisoners are able
to surmount these barriers, most cannot. Thus, even prior to 1996, habeas corpus had
ceased to be a viable remedy for most prisoners unconstitutionally deprived of their
liberty.
In the past couple of years, Congress has grafted yet another layer on top of the
Supreme Court's already high procedural hurdles. The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)5 seemingly imposes procedural hurdles even
more onerous than the Supreme Court's current impositions in federal habeas corpus
cases. I want to talk a little bit about the Act, discuss a couple of cases that interpret
its provisions, and share some thoughts about where we might be now. My
conclusion is that the Act, particularly as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does
relatively little to change the balance already achieved by the Court over the past
generation. Instead, it can be read primarily as a codification of much of the Court's
work.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was designed
primarily to deal with habeas corpus petitions filed by death sentenced individuals
rather than those serving terms of imprisonment. For example, the time limits and
successive petition limitations are designed to deal with problems of capital
litigation. It's obviously very important for a state that wishes to impose capital
punishment that its execution not be postponed indefinitely. The impatience with
delays allegedly caused by habeas corpus litigation in death penalty cases thus
created political pressure to enact strict time limits for filing federal habeas corpus
petitions. But concerns with delay should not be as important for states in noncapital litigation; if a prisoner is already serving his or her term of imprisonment, the
state loses little if delay occurs. Similarly, the argument for limiting successive
petitions was made with death penalty cases in mind. Congress did not want inmates
filing petition after petition in efforts to forestall executions. In contrast, a successive
petition by an inmate serving a term of imprisonment does not forestall the inmate's
punishment. The petition, after all, is filed while the sentence is being served.
Although the political concerns driving the bill were aimed at capital litigation, the
imposition of a statute of limitations and an almost complete bar on successive
petitions was imposed on capital and non-capital cases alike.

3. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4. See id at 90.
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261-2266 (1996).
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Thus, the new 28 U.S.C. § 2244 imposes a rigid bar on second or successive
habeas corpus petitions.6 A second petition is prohibited unless the applicant shows
either that the claim relies on a new constitutional rule made retroactive or that the
factual predicate could not have been found. In addition, the prisoner must
demonstrate that the fact, if proven in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable fact finder would find the applicant guilty.7
A fundamental question facing lower courts has been whether this bar on federal
habeas corpus should be interpreted in light of prior habeas practices, or whether it
should be seen as a vehicle allowing courts to throw out as many habeas petitions
as possible. In Slack v. McDaniel,8 decided on April twenty-sixth of this year [2000],
the lower court had dismissed a successive petition-a second habeas petition that
was filed after a first habeas petition had been dismissed-for failure to exhaust state
remedies. 9 Prior to the AEDPA, there had been a century of jurisprudence
emphasizing the obligation of petitioners to exhaust state remedies. There was longstanding precedent that the consequence of a failure to exhaust was dismissal in
order for the prisoner to exhaust state remedies.' ° No court had ever suggested, prior
to this Act, that once the petitioner had, in fact, exhausted remedies and then went
back to federal court, he would be barred from filing a federal habeas corpus petition
on the ground that the properly filed petition was successive.
Nevertheless, that was the resolution adopted by one lower court." The court
concluded that the literal prohibition on successive petitions in the AEDPA required
dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court emphasized the necessity of
examining the bar on successive petitions in light of existing federal habeas corpus
practice. The Court opined that Congress never intended, when it codified the
exhaustion remedy, to bar individuals who exhausted remedies after a dismissal and
returned to the state from ever being able to be heard in federal court. The Supreme
Court decided, therefore, that a lower court could not dismiss petitions as successive
when the first petition was dismissed without prejudice for exhaustion of remedies. 2
The second major requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 imposed by the 1996 Act was
a statute of limitations.' 3 The Act mandates a one-year limitation in the filing of
habeas corpus petitions, which begins to run from the conclusion of direct review,
with the limitation period stayed if the inmate is pursuing state post-conviction
litigation. '4
The AEDPA became effective on the date of enactment, April twenty-seventh,
1996, and the federal courts were almost immediately confronted with the task of
determining whether and how to phase in the limitation period. Some courts
determined that the limitation period could apply immediately, and, in essence,

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(c).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
529 U.S. 473 (2000).
See id. at 479.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
Slack, 529 U.S. at 479.
See id. at 487.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
See id.
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retroactively, to bar inmates filing after the effective date who might already have
waited more than a year before exhausting state remedies. However, most courts
rejected that position. Relying on the doctrine of equitable tolling,"5 which mandates
that a litigant be given a reasonable period of time in which to file a cause of action
when a newly-created limitation period would cut off an existing claim, virtually all
the federal courts decided in relatively quick succession that some extension of the
limitation period must be implied. Since the limitation was one year, the tolling
given by most courts to the limitation period was the same: one year from enactment
of the statute.
As noted, the one-year period is tolled during the time the individuals are
exhausting state remedies. Because of the requirement of exhaustion of state
remedies and the time required for exhausting collateral appeals, many inmates in
technical non-compliance with the statute of limitations due to the delay that had
occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, even after the one-year extension,
found themselves applying to federal court for relief. In April of 1997, after the oneyear period was over, a number of lower courts began dismissing cases filed by
inmates in this class for non-compliance with the limitation period.
In Hoggro v. Boone,16 this circuit rejected dismissal in these circumstances. The
court decided that a lower court must take into account the tolling provision in
assessing the timeliness of the filing and that the time during which an individual
is properly exhausting state court remedies can't apply against this one-year
period. "
Perhaps the most important provision of the new habeas corpus act was its
reformulation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the so called "standard of review." The
provision, which is new to habeas corpus, requires that "[an application for a writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits.. .unless the adjudication of the claim.. .(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States....""
In April of this year, in Terry Williams v. Taylor,9 the Supreme Court attempted
to define this language. 2 The review provision permits a habeas corpus petition to
be granted in two cases. The first is if the state court decision is contrary to federal
laws determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. This limitation,
prohibiting a habeas grant where the existing law is not already established, was
essentially already in place in habeas corpus as a result of the retroactivity doctrine
of Teague v. Lane.2 ' The second portion of the standard, dealing with mixed
questions of fact and law, which prohibits grant of a habeas petition unless a state's

15. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to allow an action to proceed when justice requires it,
even though a statutory time period has nominally elapsed. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.
89, 94-96 (1990).
16. 150 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 1998).
17. See id.
at 1226.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
19. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
20. Id at 379-90.
21. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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application of federal law is "unreasonable," is new and potentially more
significant. 22
There were three contending views of what Congress meant by "unreasonable
application." Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the term was designed to
require that a habeas court give serious attention to the state court decision but was
not designed to create a situation where a federal court would find a state court in
violation of the Constitution yet refuse to order relief. Thus, Justice Stevens
concluded that the term was not intended to mandate "substantive deference" to the
state's adjudication.23 The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, interpreted the limitation in
a way that would have ended habeas corpus as an effective way of looking at
constitutional violations. Its view of an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law is that if any reasonable federal judge could have found that
the state court resolution was a proper application of federal law, the court's
resolution could not be said to be unreasonable.2 Since there is virtually no legal
question on which one can't have more than one opinion, I think that circuit's view,
if enacted, would have virtually eliminated Section 2254 for state prisoners.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, took an intermediate position. She
looked to the Court's jurisprudence with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel
and Brady5 violations,' and concluded that the appropriate standard should be
whether the state court's application was "objectively unreasonable." 27 If so, federal
courts have the power to and are obliged to overturn the state conviction.' Indeed,
in Terry Williams the majority found objectively unreasonable a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel that many lower federal courts had previously found entirely
unobjectionable: an attorney's failure in a death penalty case to produce and find
findable evidence of mitigation.29
In my own view, Justice O'Connor's interpretation does not fundamentally
change the legal landscape in non-death habeas corpus cases. Whatever the legal
test, federal courts in the last ten years have not been granting habeas writs when
they thought that state courts were engaging in "reasonable" but "incorrect"
applications of federal constitutional principles. As a practical matter, non-egregious
violations were tolerated in most federal courts, even before this new statute. To be
sure, this new standard of review places a formal hurdle that did not previously exist
in the path of habeas corpus litigants-it's not enough to show that the state court
is wrong with respect to the constitutional adjudication, one must show that the
opinion was "objectively unreasonable." As a practical matter, writs already were
being granted only infrequently, and the degree of deference shown toward the state
was already substantial. In sum, if you look at the substantive result in Terry

22. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I).
23. Terry Willgiars, 529 U.S. at 374.
24. Id. at 377.
25. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable
to defendant a violation of Due Process).
26. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 399-416 (O'Connor, J., opinion of the Court with respect to Part II,
concurring in part).
27. Id. at 390-391.
28. See id.
at391.
29. See id. at399.
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Williams, the direction given to the Fourth Circuit was, "It's not dead yet. It's not
over until we say it's over, and it's not over yet."
In the companion case of Williams v. Taylor,a° the Court made a similar judgment
with respect to evidentiary hearings. The AEDPA standard with respect to
evidentiary hearings prohibits grant of a hearing if the applicant has failed to
develop the factual basis of a claim in state court proceedings. 3 The Fourth Circuit
interpreted that as saying, "If you didn't develop it we don't really care why you
failed to develop it."'32 This standard eliminated virtually any opportunity for a
prisoner to be granted an evidentiary hearing because, by definition, if the state court
has not held an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner has failed to develop the facts.
Relying on its prior decision of Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,33 the Supreme Court
rejected this overly rigid interpretation. The Court concluded that a prisoner's
"failure" to develop facts must be taken to imply some degree of fault on behalf of
the prisoner.34 In Williams v. Taylor,the reason the evidence hadn't been developed
was because the state had failed to disclose it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
reversed the Fourth Circuit again. It left habeas corpus in approximately the same
position it was in before congressional intervention.
In sum, while habeas corpus has been diminished significantly, it has not been
eliminated. The restrictions imposed by the AEDPA may complete the work of the
Supreme Court in limiting habeas corpus for state prisoners, but it does not set up
an entirely new regime. Habeas corpus still exists, albeit in shrunken form, as a
remedy for state prisoners whose convictions occurred as a result of constitutional
violations.
STEVE KESSLER:" Which case was decided on Monday?
GOTTLIEB: It's a case called Apprendi v. New Jersey.3" It is not in my materials,
because it was just decided Monday and it's a case that may or may not be
incredibly important, depending on whether some of the concurring opinions state
what the law is going to become. It involved a hate crime enhancement to a New
Jersey statute. The court held there was a violation of the defendant's jury trial right
when the court imposed the enhancement at sentencing and increased the sentence
beyond the legislatively-mandated maximum for the underlying offense.37 If this
case means only that a judge may not add to a statutory maximum at sentencing,
then, it seems to me, it is going to be a difficult case in some federal drug sentences
and it's going to involve a lot of litigation.38 But its effects will be manageable.
Justice Thomas, however, thought the case stood for a broader rule: "[A] 'crime'
includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment...

30. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (DATE).
32. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 428.

33. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 433.
Attorney at Law, Lawrence, Kansas.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
See id. at 490.
See id. at 470.
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crime, just
the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated
39
as much as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petty larceny.,
According to Justice O'Connor, if Justice Thomas's position, in fact, becomes
accepted, any fact that has an effect in real terms of increasing the maximum
punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted to a jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' She states, "Justice Thomas essentially
concedes that the rule outlined in his concurring opinion would require the
invalidation of the Sentencing Guidelines.' ' And, "As I have explained, the Court
does not say whether these schemes are constitutional, but its reasoning strongly
suggests that they are not.",42 Justice O'Connor concludes, "[T]he Court's decision
threatens to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking to
invalidate
their sentences in whole or in part on the authority of the Court's decision
43
today.
There are almost half a million cases that have been decided under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.44 Many of them, including quite a number of former clients
of mine in Leavenworth, 5 will be very interested very soon in the results of this
decision. One of the remarkable things about the decision in this case is that the
Justices who made up the majority didn't make much of an effort in footnotes to
discourage the filing of litigation based on the broader reading of the case. So it's
potentially an extremely important case in terms of where the law is going to go.
PROFESSOR COYNE: My name is Randall Coyne and I'm a professor of law
at the University of Oklahoma Law School. What I'd like to do in the brief time that
I have with you this afternoon is to first take you through the highlights of the
handout I distributed in order to give you a sense of what death row looks like here
in the Tenth Circuit.
All six states' within the Tenth Judicial Circuit have the death penalty as a
sanction. Some we see imposing it more vigorously than others. There's been, of
course, a dramatic increase in the number of prisoners found on death row
throughout the country. Since executions resumed with Gary Gilmore's execution
in Utah in 1977, there's been a rapid increase in the number of inmates on death
row. Around the time of Gilmore's execution, there were some 500 or so inmates
on death row. We're now topping 3500. The ABA Journal a month or so ago had
this cover story you're probably familiar with.
It shows a picture of the electric chair and asks, "Death Knell for Death Row?"4' 7
Perhaps a more appropriate headline would have been, "Is Habeas Corpus Dying?"
It seems to me the death penalty remains very vigorous. Having said that, it's
important to note that three of the four most recent decisions of the Supreme Court

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concuring).
Id. at 525.
Id at 544.
ld. at 550-55 1.
1d at551.
See id.
United States Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas.
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.
Mark Hansen, Death Knellfor Death Row?, 86 A.B.A. J.40 (June 2000).
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on habeas have come out in favor of the petitioner.4 8 So there is some good news for
defense attorneys in those opinions as well as for prosecutors.
Last year we had a total of ninety-eight executions throughout the country. This
year, as of June twenty-third, we're already at fifty. We're in a position to pass what
was an all-time historic high since the resumption of executions in 1977. Of course,
Texas leads all states in the number of folks on death row and in the number of
people they execute. Texas, as of June twenty-third of this year, executed 222
people. Not too far down the list though, is the state of Oklahoma, the state from
which I hail, which as of that date put to death 28 people. In fact, in one four-week
period in Oklahoma, we had an execution every week. Wyoming has put to death
one inmate since the resumption of executions. Utah has punished by death and
executed six people.
Pending executions are largely in the state of Texas. Of those that are expected
to be executed in the next three or four months, I'd say ninety percent are from
Texas, but there are a couple of things worth noting. One, of course, is that there is
an Oklahoma execution set for July and many more to soon follow if what the
experts tell me is true, and I imagine it is. But also, New Mexico may get back into
the business of executing people. There is a person here in New Mexico named
Terry Clark who has at least a "soft" date, meaning it's not absolutely certain he will
be executed on July third.49
Also, of more national significance, the federal death chamber, which was built
a few years ago in Terre Haute, Indiana, is expected to put to death the first federal
prisoner this summer on August fifth. Juan Raul Garza is set to be put to death by
the federal government.5' That would be the first federal execution in over thirty
years, I believe. The federal death row is very, very small compared to some, but
there are a number of people interested in the federal death penalty as well.
Colorado currently has six inmates on death row, at least as of April first. The
statistics are a bit old. All six are men, two blacks, two whites, and two persons
described as "other." Kansas, which in the past few years reinstated the death
penalty, has four white men on death row. Neither of those jurisdictions has women
on death row. In New Mexico, five males are on death row; four of those are white.
Oklahoma looks to me to be the only state within the Tenth Circuit that has any
women on death row. And there's a very real possibility, if not a strong probability,
that later this year Oklahoma will become the first state in the Tenth Circuit to put
to death a woman since the resumption of executions in 1977. 51 Other states have

48. See Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (holding that petitioner preserved his claims of
juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct through diligent effort to develop facts supporting his claim); Terry
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding that petitioner's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding that defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel).
49. Terry Clark was sentenced to die after he was convicted of kidnapping and killing a young girl in 1986.
He was scheduled to die December 1, 2000, but received a third delay. See Child-Killer'sExecutionPostponedUntil
Next Year, ALBUQUERQUE J., August 30, 2000, at Al.
50. President Clinton delayed Garza'a execution until June 2001 because of concerns about possible racial
disparities in the application of capital punishment. See Neil A. Lewis and David Johnson, By the Book- Justice,
Justice Shalt Thou Pursue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, § 4, at I.
51. Wanda Jean Allen was executed in Oklahoma on January 11,2001.

Winter 2001 ]

HABEAS CORPUS

done it, Florida, I believe, Arkansas, and Texas. Oklahoma will join those ranks by
executing a female who resides on our death row.
We have-again these statistics are very old-three or more women on death row
and probably upwards of 150 folks on death row in Oklahoma. Utah has a death row
of eleven persons, two blacks, six whites, two Hispanics, one identified as "other,"
and all are male. In Wyoming, there are two white males on death row.
There's a great passion for the death penalty in Texas and it seems to have spread
to Oklahoma in a way that's of great concern to folks who work in this area, both
in prosecution and on the defense side. I also wanted to draw your attention to, in
just a moment, a study you've perhaps heard about. It's been widely publicized. It
was a study of capital cases conducted by a group of Columbia University law
researchers. It's called the Liebman Study" and it's available on the Internet.
Essentially, it's a study examining twenty-three years of cases on appeal for rates
of error. The findings of the Liebman Study seemed to suggest the importance of
careful court review and dedicated lawyering, particularly in capital cases. And not
just the importance of careful review, but the results from the kind of attention we
spend on capital cases, or should be spending.
There was an overall rate of prejudicial error noted in the study of the American
capital system of sixty-eight percent.53 In other words, serious reversible error was
found in nearly seven out of ten capital cases of the thousands of cases that the
Liebman researchers undertook to review. How those parsed out as between the state
and federal courts is interesting to note. State courts threw out about forty-one
percent of death sentences.' Of the smaller group of cases that sailed through state
review without any error being detected, federal courts later found serious error
sufficient to undermine the reliability of those cases in forty percent of those
sentences. 5 So it's not a system that, at least from an objective standpoint of
statistical analysis, inspires a lot of confidence in the results, at least concerning the
results of that original jury determination on whether a given defendant should be
put to death or whether his life should be spared.
What were the most common errors identified by the Liebman Study? First, I
suppose, was attorney incompetence, in large part defense attorneys who should
have found evidence, who should have discovered information, and who should
have presented it to the finder of fact, but failed to do so.56 The second most
important reason for the number of errors was prosecutorial misconduct,57
prosecutors who found that type of information, who located evidence that should
have been turned over to the defense and should have been presented to the jury, but
was not. It is a system run by human beings and error obviously is going to be
inevitable.

52. James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West,A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 19731995. June 12, 2000. Available at http://justice.policy.net/jpreport/index.htld.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id at 5.
57. Id
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It's worth your time to get on the website. I guess I feel comforted by being part
of the habeas panel today because that's perhaps the one environment you can be in
and actually talk about statistics in such a way that it doesn't bore people, compared
to some of the doctrines we're going to talk about and that Professor Gottlieb has
talked about. They don't sound so bland after all.
There are report cards given based upon these error rates. There is one for the
Tenth Circuit, and each state is given its own report card in respect to reversal rates
and rates of error. I won't take up your time or opportunity to question by going
over those. But they are also available on that website.
Professor Gottlieb mentioned just how difficult this area of law is from a
prosecutor's standpoint, and from that of the Attorney General's office, judges, and
magistrates, and certainly from defense counsel's standpoint. There was an
interesting quote of Justice Breyer talking about the complexity of Supreme Court
habeas jurisprudence. He said that area of Supreme Court law has "a complexity that
in practice can deny the fundamental constitutional protection that habeas corpus
seeks to assure. 58 He also said that habeas corpus has an attractive power, only for
those who like difficult puzzles.59
Well, I sit before you as someone who hates difficult puzzles. I'm not very good
at difficult puzzles. What makes the habeas puzzle so difficult is, of course, the
series of procedural landmines, or hurdles, or barriers to actually having the court
turn its attention to the merits of a particular claim. Procedural default has been
mentioned by Professor Gottlieb. Cause and prejudice, abuse of the writ, successive
petitions, adequate and independent state court grounds--each of these seem to me
to be an opportunity to avoid looking at what really happened at trial, what really
happened in that court room several years ago.
The structure of the new law, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, essentially consists of two components. One was Chapter 153, ° which applies
to the non-capital habeas cases. Those are the rules that are also applying to, I
assume, all capital cases right now because the second chapter, Chapter 154,1 which
creates special rules for death penalty cases, as far as I know, has not yet taken effect
in any particular area. Essentially, Chapter 154 would create even shorter time
limitations for persons under sentence of death. Where Chapter 153 provides a oneyear statute of limitations, Chapter 154 would chop that year down to a six-month
or a 180-day period of time. 62 It would also impose limits on the courts' time frames
to make their decisions. District courts would have 180 days within which to rule
on a habeas petition. 63 Appellate courts would have to render their decision within
120 days, and so on.64
In order to take advantage of that faster track of habeas cases-and again it would
only apply in capital cases-the state would have to meet certain requirements for

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 454 (2000) (Breyer, J., concuning).
Id. at 458.
28 U.S.C. § 2241-2255 (1995).
28 U.S.C. § 2261-2266 (Supp. 1 1996).
28 U.S.C. § 2263(a).
28 U.S.C. § 2266(b).
Id.
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the appointment of competent counsel with adequate resources in state postconviction proceedings. Now the statute takes great pains to assure all of us that
Congress has no intention of creating any right to effective assistance of counsel
with respect to either the state court proceedings or the federal habeas proceedings.
But it will be interesting to see how various jurisdictions litigate that issue about
whether they have in place an adequate mechanism for the protection of death row
inmates in state post-conviction proceedings so that we can trigger the provisions
of Chapter 154 and put these death row inmates on an even faster track than the
general provisions provided in Chapter 153.
So what that means as a practical matter is that Chapter 153, the provisions that
Professor Gottlieb was talking about, really is the law that's in place even in capital
habeas cases. Until states affirmatively opt-into Chapter 154 and the quicker
provisions, we're going to be left with the body of law as it exists with respect to the
general non-capital habeas cases. It's important and worth noting that before 1996,
when the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was passed, there was no
statute of limitations on habeas actions and there have been cases in which habeas
relief was granted twenty to twenty-five years after the conviction was in place.
Now, of course, the limitations period is one year and in capital cases may
someday be whittled down to six months. On the back of the handout I provided
you, there is a list of persons found to be innocent after having been sentenced to
death throughout the country. You'll see the names of a number of folks who were
convicted within the Tenth Circuit. There are several in Oklahoma that I have had
the occasion to meet since their release from death row.
There was a case out of the Ninth Circuit where the district court initially
dismissed the petitioner's claim because it wasn't ripe: Arizona hadn't set his
execution date. 5 Well, Arizona got around to setting an execution date and the
argument then became, well, this is the second or successive petition. You had your
first bite of the apple and now you're coming back again. And happily, for those of
us on the defense side more often than the prosecution side, the Supreme Court held
seven to two that they would not treat this case as a successive petition."
That 1998 decision, along with the Slack67 case that Professor Gottlieb mentioned,
and the language in various opinions, particularly those of Justice Kennedy and
Justice O'Connor in recent Supreme Court decisions, give me hope that there at least
remains one fair opportunity, one bite at the apple. The apple not being some arcane
procedural rule but being the merits of a constitutional claim. Professor Gottlieb and
I were discussing this at lunch, it's almost as if for years and years the Supreme
Court was winnowing away at habeas corpus, and winnowing away and cutting back
and cutting back and then Congress jumped in with its cleaver and hammer and the
Supreme Court said, "Hey, that's our job. Don't do it." So the results of the
interpretation of that statute, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
are remarkable.

65. See Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
66. See id. at 645.
67. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
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Justice Souter has referred to it as being more like a sow's ear than a silk purse.
And those of you who labor with it daily in your chambers or in your offices I
suspect might agree.
*SCOTT BRADEN:" I don't really have questions, Randy, as much as a comment
on the requirement of competency to be executed. The question arises when the
person becomes insane while he is in prison, which does happen, and you didn't
have the opportunity to present it the first time. I think the question is still kind of
percolating in the Supreme Court, and the Tenth Circuit has answered by saying that
if you didn't have the foresight to know the person was going to be insane when you
filed the first habeas petition, you can't come back in a second petition. But you
know that still remains the big question. The operative fact that you didn't know was
the person's insanity. Or it could be something other than insanity. It could be that
the person suffered a stroke in prison. Some of the guys in prison are old. You could
get beat up and be in a coma. The question of insanity means the opportunity to
assist your lawyers and understand what's happening regardless of whether you are
mentally insane or however you find it. I really think, based on what's happening,
that Wainwrightv. Sykes6 9 really is not the law anymore.
COYNE: So the Tenth Circuit has overruled the Supreme Court. Is that what
you're saying?
BRADEN: I'm sorry, that's my opinion. I shouldn't say that with the judges here.
Me and my big mouth.
KESSLER: How do most states in the circuit provide counsel for post-conviction
remedies in death penalty cases? Does Oklahoma have a special group that does that
or a capital defenders office?
COYNE: Susan, do you want to answer that question? You handle those cases.
SUSAN OTTO:70 Well, the defense system is currently funded to provide some
services for post-conviction. They do not have a separate fund for conflict cases. So
you're vying for dollars with the funding agency if you're a private practitioner on
the panel and you're taking a conflict case. The funding for post-conviction is
always variable.
COYNE: Does it come separately from the defense or is it part of the overall
budget?
OTTO: It is part of the overall budget and it's not separate. So, you really are
vying for these dollars. And the state post-conviction process has been amended in
Oklahoma so that now you have to file your post-conviction application with the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals within ninety days after you filed your direct
appeal. And many times, your first post-conviction may be denied while direct
appeal gets decided.
COYNE: Well, in Oklahoma it's a real twisted system because, as Susan said, the
post-conviction petition can be denied before you're down for direct appeal. The
habeas corpus clock sometimes begins when you're denied from your direct appeal
certiorari petition as opposed to what you normally would think would be the post-

68. Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
69. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
70. Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
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conviction certiorari petitions. You're already out of court on post-conviction and
sometimes a year or more will pass before your direct appeal is completed.
OTTO: And then, of course, the other interesting correlating question to that is,
who's keeping track of this? Because I can assure you that the men who are on death
row are in no position to be doing this. And that leads to another question. So far,
no one that I'm aware of has been thrown out of federal court based on this deadline.
Not that I'm aware of.
COYNE: If I may, on the question of statute of limitations, the statute of
limitations in the 1996 Act does apply to both state and federal prisoners, that
yearlong statute of limitations. But the question has been raised: What if a federal
prisoner was denied habeas corpus at the district court level, but doesn't apply for
certiorari? Some federal courts of appeals are saying, in effect, that the year begins
to run from the issuance of the mandate from the court of appeals and other circuits
are chiming in saying that even if the inmate doesn't file for certiorari, the statute
doesn't begin to run until the time for filing for certiorari has run. And there is
currently a split in the circuits-I believe five circuits in favor of the former view
and two in favor of the latter view. The state inmates have their statute of
limitations, their one-year period tolled, as long as they properly filed application
for state post-conviction or other collateral relief. This raises the question of what
"properly filed" means and the circuits are split on that. Is it a question of state law?
Four circuits say yes. Is it a question of federal law? Two circuits say it's a question
of federal law.
JUDGE SVEN HOLMES:7 1 Randy, in your materials it points out that only eight
of the cases of the eighty-seven that have been freed from death row were DNA
cases?
COYNE: That's right. And in Oklahoma our governor recently signed a bill that
gives hope to folks that they will be able to use DNA increasingly as a tool to
demonstrate the exoneration of capital inmates. There was a fellow on death row in
Oklahoma for a number of years, Robert Miller, who asserted his innocence, always
and forever. There was no funding available in Oklahoma to have the DNA testing
done. This was the rape and murder of an elderly woman. The lawyer was casting
about, trying desperately to find funds. Some television show, 20-20, came forward
and said here's the deal: we'll do the DNA testing and we'll reveal the results on
nationwide television, sort of in the nature of Geraldo Rivera discovering Al
Capone's long-lost safe. I don't know, good for ratings, maybe good for the client,
maybe bad. Robert Miller said, "Yeah, yeah. Let's go for it." The attorney was less
sanguine and didn't get the DNA testing done then. Ultimately it was done. Robert
was released after a period of seven to nine years on our death row. So DNA
promises to be of great value to those states that are going to take a look at
innocence seriously.
JUDGE ROBERT HENRY:7 What strikes me is that it is much less of a
contributor to the findings of innocence than people generally believe. In fact, of the
three death row habeas cases that I've done, one of which I granted relief, two I did

71. United States District Judge, Tenth Circuit, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
72. United States Circuit Judge, Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
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not, actual innocence was never an issue. They had DNA for years, but they never
even raised the notion of actual innocence and these cases cause me to believe that
actual innocence, which is certainly compelling as a reason to pause on any capital
case, is not the real reason why so many people are being freed, it is less than one
percent.
COYNE: And, as you know, actual innocence doesn't get you to federal court in
and of itself. So if you have it, it's only a justification for whatever procedural
bypasses may have occurred. So it's something that has to be litigated at the state
level.
The thing about actual innocence in the habeas context is, it's not a federal client,
but what Herrerav. Collins73 basically says, and what Justice O'Connor talks about
is, what is the client's underlying constitutional violation? But I can guarantee you
as a habeas corpus practitioner, if you've got an innocent person who is on death
row, there damned sure is a constitutional violation in there somewhere.
There is a debate I think, and I think Justice O'Connor pointed it out, that they
may think that executing an innocent person is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, but the Supreme Court has not said that. There is no law that says that
right now. So if you have no other claim, other than that the client is purely
innocent, I'm not sure you're going to get into federal court.
GOTTLIEB: Well, at least Williamson v. Ward74 is an example. It was a case
where there were thirty-seven legal theories advanced. I'm not sure that thirty-six
of them weren't infirm, but everyone knew that if Judge Seay thought the guy didn't
do it, that was good enough for us to back up and take another look.
OTTO: I think one of the reasons that DNA testing may not be done in the
principle round is that, with the exception of very, very few cases, it's extremely
difficult to get access to the samples. The Oklahoma statute that's been passed fell
short of the Illinois model. The Illinois model gives you a right and access to the
samples, and then to get back into the court on those claims, and the compromise
was that you would have to have access to money to fund this. But it's still up to the
district attorney's office to decide whether they're going to give the samples. In
Oklahoma City, for example, we had a continuing struggle to find evidence. A
bunch of evidence would simply disappear, because it had not been held in custody
properly.
I know that one of the cases that we have now, but for the fact that I could make
a demonstration that we had money to do this testing, I would not have received the
sample. It wasn't going to cost the state of Oklahoma any money. They were
worried about spending money on this, and that was why the Oklahoma court of
appeals said, "Go ahead and give them the samples and let them test them."
I can't imagine a circumstance where a federal judge who is presented with actual
evidence would send it on to the court of appeals, when there's an opportunity right
here and they have to address it. But that is a rare circumstance. Just because your
guy may be guilty perhaps, doesn't necessarily mean the Constitution hasn't been
violated. The whole point of habeas is to find out if the Constitution was violated.

73. 506 U.S. 390, 425 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 507 U.S. 1001 (1993).
74. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
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It's not a question of somebody's innocence, if you boil it down, it's really hard to
get past, particularly for the general public.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION ONE
AUDIENCE MEMBER: One more question on Apprendi. Do you think the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari separately on the drug statute or do you think
they're going to let it percolate for a while?
GOTTLIEB: Since I could have never predicted this case, it's crazy for me to try
to predict that one. There are so many drug defendants. In this case, unlike the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, where you're reaching with the concurring opinion
and the dissenting opinion to get to the invalidation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, you don't have to go far at all for the drug statutes. So I think it would
be responsible for them to take a case fairly quickly.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Apprendi has got to be held retroactive in order for the
successive petitions to be successful. If Apprendi is held retroactive, then successive
petitions fit within the rule under the AEDPA, don't they?
GOTTLIEB: Yes. You have a finding here of a new constitutional principle or
at least an expansion of a constitutional principle that ought to go to the accuracy
and, it seems to me, the right of a jury trial goes to the accuracy of the fact finding;
at least there's an argument there.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION TWO
HENRY: How many states have enacted the Chapter 154?
COYNE: No state has yet opted into Chapter 154. Tennessee is seeking to get that
status. In order to opt-into 154, in order to get the benefits of the six-month statute
of limitations, you have to demonstrate that you are providing, as I said, competent
counsel and adequate resources to your capital convicts during their state postconviction appeals. Thus far, everyone's under Chapter 153 because Chapter 154
hasn't been litigated to the point where anyone would say, "Okay, you're not going
to get the benefit of the short extension."
HENRY: There was a question about criteria, which is a good question. Is there
any guidance on what those terms mean?
COYNE: None that I see in the face of the statute itself. Now, if we looked at the
legislative history, maybe we'd find a little bit more about what they mean. My
sense is that there is so much benefit in the revisions to Chapter 153 that the states
don't really need to cut back from one year to six months, so that may be some of
their reluctance. Why litigate these issues and chop the time in half? The problem
with compressing the time is, if you look at the latter part of the handout I
distributed, you'll notice the folks that have been released from death row after
demonstrations of innocence since 1973. 1 think seven folks in Oklahoma have been
released as innocent. They are not people whose constitutional rights had been
violated, but who have been found not to have committed the factual crime. The
evidence in support of those claims tends to percolate up after years and years.
Maybe a new district attorney comes in and decides to do the right thing. Maybe an
investigator leaves and the file ends up in the hands of a lawyer. Maybe for the first
time a competent lawyer is asking and looking at the factual predicate for the case.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 31

It seems to me, we're talking about executing people who are innocent, but even
now, the mindset of some of the Justices of the Supreme Court is at a point where
there's a growing sentiment, that yes, that's going to happen. And the debate has
maybe shifted: Is that an acceptable cost? If so, what percent are we going to
tolerate?
HENRY: It seems to me that Oklahoma ought to do the right thing and provide
good counsel anyway; but as a judge, I hate it when Congress helps us by giving us
deadlines, particularly on death cases, to decide something in 120 days. Every case
is hard, and they're hard on chambers; they're hard on judges. I don't know a judge
who likes them.
And we're supposed to be conservative, but I don't know any judge who likes
them. I know a lot of judges would like to get rid of them. I broached this point to
a couple of legislators in Oklahoma and got no action. I wondered how you evaluate
it?
COYNE: From my standpoint, the death penalty is siphoning off huge resources.
I'm glad you mentioned that. You have to look at the toll that the death penalty
takes, not just on defense lawyers, and not just on the families 9f the victims who
have to go through the ordeal, but the prison staff. They have to prepare the inmate
for execution. They've gone to work every day for seven, eight, nine years and seen
this fellow and maybe they have a rapport with him and the next thing they know,
they're asking him what he wants to eat for his last meal. They're perhaps part of
the team that's being required to prepare him for execution. It's really incalculable,
the kind of harm it does. But death penalty defense lawyers lose lots of cases and
they're a pretty callous, hard-drinking, pretty depressed lot. Hard to stay in
this-I'm speaking from personal experience, not for anyone here-it has its toll.
In terms of Oklahoma, a study done by the University of Oklahoma showed the
argument with respect to deterrence. We were going to resume executing in 1990,
and we did with Charles Coleman. A couple of professors at the University of
Oklahoma wanted to look at whether or not this highly publicized execution would
deter, whether people would learn from it. Instead, what they found was a zero
effect in most categories, and the only significant effect was an increase in strangeron-stranger homicides, which they described as a "brutalization" effect.
Even the Supreme Court, it seems to me, is dropping the deterrence argument.
Clearly, there is special deterrence. Those people that are executed don't stand up
and re-offend. There's only one case reported where anyone was ever put to death
and actually went on to re-offend, and that was a fellow named Jesus from a Middle
Eastern jurisdiction; and that doesn't apply in the Tenth Circuit, as far as I know, or
in Oklahoma. Changing minds, boy, I don't know. There is a lot of attention paid
to innocence; the presidential election focuses a lot of energy on it. It's a tough,
tough issue.
ROB RAMANA: 75 I wondered if you had any more thoughts on the term,
"objectively unreasonable," or where the courts might go with that? My thought76is
that it sounds the most like the qualified immunity standard in civil rights cases.

75. Law Clerk to Judge Robert Henry, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
76. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that "government officials performing
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COYNE: My view is that there is, and I may be proved wrong, less there than
meets the eye, because I just think that even though the standard has been de novo
review, if you plug in de novo review with the Teague Doctrine," you just do not
have a lot of cases where courts have been granting habeas corpus writs where they
don't believe that the state is really seriously misguided. I suppose in some months
we'll find a circuit court decision that is going to say, "This violated the
Constitution, but I don't think it was objectively unreasonable." But I would be
willing to lay reasonable odds that that is going to be an incredibly small category
when stacked up against, "This was okay," or 'This violated the Constitution and
it was unreasonable."
I have looked at how few writs have been granted and I have done the research
and I am amazed at what I found. In non-death cases, there are courts in this country
that are just not granting writs and there's nowhere for these individuals to go, as far
as I'm concerned.
I know I'm not giving you any legal gloss to put on this, but I think that most
courts in the Strickland78 case are going to say, "I not only think that that is
objectively reasonable, but, most judges would find that objectively reasonable, or
I wouldn't have ruled that way in the first place."" Particularly in Strickland, you're
starting with a presumption in favor of attorney competence. You're starting with
the presumption against hindsight. In order to find them unreasonable to begin with
in Strickland, you have got this fairly significant hurdle to overcome. Well, I think
if you get that far, you're very likely to have met the standard in the statute.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I had a question for Professor Coyne about the Liebman
Study. I'm kind of playing devil's advocate because I'm a public defender, so I don't
espouse this necessarily, but it seems to me the argument can be made that those
were liberal courts that were reaching out to find error to prevent someone from
being put to death and, therefore, the Leibman Study doesn't really mean that much.
COYNE: Right. Now, that old saw, "Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics," I suppose
comes to mind. I know Jim Liebman, and I know he took extraordinary care
anticipating this type of criticism. I haven't gone through the mountain of
information that he did to make a defense for him, but in terms of its reliability, let
the critics have at it and see where the chips fall. You're right, it is in so many other
areas vulnerable to that kind of criticism and that kind of attack.
And there has been a sense that over time, and certainly since 1973 to 1995, the
courts have become more conservative. The Supreme Court has told them they must
become more conservative in the granting of the writ and so on. So, I wouldn't be
surprised if his research showed that the cases in which relief was granted were
heavy-loaded in the 1970s and less in the 1980s and perhaps less still in the 1990s.
I just don't know.

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
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